Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
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APR 16 2011
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In TI

Edward H. Flint

Petitioner

v.

KATIE KING

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1-Does the ruling by the United States Supreme Court in **Stump v Sparkman 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978)** eliminate the requirement that a judge has to obey all court rules, cannons and state laws

2- What are the limits and meanings of **"normal functions"** and **"clear absence of all jurisdiction** in granting immunity to a judge as used in the Judgment issued by the United State Supreme Court in **Stump v Sparkman 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978)**?

3- Is violating of the Kentucky Supreme Court Rules, violating Kentucky Statutes, denying a party Due Process violating Kentucky's Code of Procedures Rules and Cannons considered to be a normal function for a judge as stated in **Stump v Sparkman 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978)**?

4- Was the trial court correct that no cause of action exists against a judge for judicial actions except when the judge acts was in the clear absence of jurisdiction, even when the judge denied Petitioner a Due Process trial and the judge violated Kentucky Supreme Court Rules and state laws and cannons ?

5- Was the trial and appeal courts correct when they ruled, a judge has immunity on all decisions a judge makes, regardless of the circumstances, if court rules and state laws, has been violated.

6- Is Chief Judge Roberts correct when he stated **"Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules. They apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. The judge makes sure everybody plays by the rules**

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NO._____

Edward H. Flint, **Petitioner**

v.

Katie King, Judge **Respondent**

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Edward H. Flint the Petitioner prays, that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court case No. 10-5565 entered in the above case on, January 12, 2011

OPINION BELOW

The judgment of the Sixth Circuit entered on January 12, 2011

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked under 28 USC 1254

Parties

Petitioner
Edward H. Flint,

Respondents
Katie King, Judge

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural history

This action arises out of a complaint filed in Jefferson County Kentucky Circuit Court on October 2007 case No. 07-CI-10558. Petitioner was Pro, Se and was 76 years old. The case was about a flawed election for officers at a Condo Association where Petitioner lived. Petitioner knew based on evidence he had seen, the ballots had been substituted for and when the Board of Directors refuse to response to his letters asking that a meeting be called for a reelection and the Petitioner filed a suit.

Petition was Pro, Se and three judges violated Kentucky Supreme Court's rule regarding the moving and reassigning of cases. The judges by Kentucky Supreme Court Rules could not move the case without a reason, which they didn't have.

Petitioner sued the three judges in Federal District Court. The District Court granted the three judges immunity and dismissed Petitioner case. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court order dismissing the appeal. Petitioner appealed to this court for Writ of certiorari and this court denied Petitioner certiorari.

Petitioner filed a different case in Jefferson County District Court and the first judge, on the first hearing denied Petitioner every thing he asked for and out of the blue for no reason,(as the tape of the hearing shows), the judge threaten to put Petitioner in jail.

The case was assigned to Judge King the respondent. Judge King refused to let Petitioner have any discovery. Judge King threatens to put Petitioner in jail, for no reason as the recorded audio CD shows. It became clear that Judge King had been talked to by other judges in the court system and no judge in Jefferson County was going to give Petitioner a fair and honest trial. Petitioner sued Judge King in Federal Court alleging her of violating his "civil rights" by "Terroristic threatening. "

Judge King would not grant Petitioner discovery. Petitioner asked Judge King to move the case out of Jefferson County and she refused. Petitioner gave the trial court an audio CD recordings and the trial court stated a judge is granted the power to declare a person in contempt and thereby to put him in jail. The trial court judge is saying that a judge can on its own declare a person in contempt, when the CD shows there was no reason for Judge King to do what she did, except that other judges had told her to get Flint, because he sued fellow judges.

Petitioner asked all four judges to let him move the case to another county and all four refused, because they did not want Flint to have a chance to win a case in any court, including Federal Court. All four judges denied Petitioner discovery.

The Federal District Court has dismissed all four of Petitioners cases against the judges. The Court of Appeals has denied Petitioner any relief. On all cases where Petitioner has sued judges, the Federal District Court dismissed all cases based on the fact that regardless of the bases for the suit, stating judges have absolute immunity. Each

Judge cited **Stump v Sparkman 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978)**

The Court of Appeals upholds the District Courts and states that the Supreme Court 1978 ruling has not changed nor has the language in Stump v Sparkman been changed or clarified and therefore they have no choice but to grant immunity, regardless of how bad the actions by the judge was.

Arguments

Petitioner argues that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals hung it case based on the district court dismissal and stated that "Judges are generally entitled to immunity from personal liability for actions taken on the bench. :a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the actions he took was in error, was done maliciously or in excess of his authority; rather he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction" *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)

No court in Jefferson County has said one word about what rights Petitioner had to due process. Petitioner states that denying Due Process, violating Courts rules and state's laws can not be judicial actions and therefore is non-judicial.

If this court doesn't clarify the *Stump v. Sparkman* ruling there will never again be an honest judge in America. All Judges in America sooner or later will harm someone and use this case as an excuse.

There is no way the court system in America can keep judges under control from abusing the system, except for the possibility that a judge could be sued by a jury. The judge in this case as the record will show violated every issue to see

that Petitioner never received a fair trial. Judge King had pressure on her, because Petitioner trying to find justice, sued judges.

Recently the United State Senate removed a judge for violating rules and being on the take. If this court thinks the same thing is not going, then you are living in a make believe land in your mind.

This court has the future of the America justice system in their hands. By leaving the Stump v Sparkman case as is, will set off a fire storm in every court house across America to see which party has the most money to buy a judge in a case. You children, your grandchildren's future children depend on this court's action and the legend you want to leave.

Petitioner again will tell this court that there are many, many cases being handled today in our country by corrupt judges and congress can not pass a law to stop it. The only change of having an honest justice system is by this court to write the rules on how a judge must conduct them self and allow judges to be sue if it can be proven they violated the rules. This court let the pendulum swing to far when they wrote Stump v. Sparkman and this court now has a chance to frame the future of justice in America, even more that the framers of our constitution. Does any member of this court believe that our fore fathers would have let judges do as the please.

Our fore fathers could not see the future and see how judges can be so corrupt. If they could, maybe they would have set up a different justice system, because they wanted an honest system.

Our country was founded by people who were running away from what is now taking place by judges.

If the President of our country can be sued then why should anyone be exempt?

The appeals court in their ruling stated and I quote,

"Here Judge King engaged in conduct soundly within the scope of her judicial duties and within the court's jurisdiction. Contrary to Flint's argument, even if Judge King erred in finding him in contempt of court, her decision is still protected by judicial immunity because it was made within the scope of her official duties as a judge. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. Finally, although Flint argues that Stump is "bad law," it has not been overruled by the Supreme Court and we are bound by the precedent set forth therein

This court owes it to every America to frame the rules on which a judge can be sued or tell the people that a judge can not be sued under any condition.

This court has an opportunity to leave its mark on America history forever.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1- This honorable body should want to see that every citizen of America is granted Due Process.

2- This court should and needs to clarify the meaning of the wording of "Clear Absence of all Jurisdiction and normal functions" as used in *Stump v. Sparkman*.

3- Only by straightening out the question of immunity for judges, which has been raging ever since the ruling was made in 1978, will true

confidence exist in the justice system in America, that the justice system is working hard to make sure every American will receive justice in the entire court system, through out America. With out total confidence in honest judges America can not stand

4- Petitioner deserves an opportunity to try his case.

5- If all judges was honest this ruling would not be needed, but like all parts of our society, there are bad eggs in every group.

CONCLUSION

1- The language in *Stump v. Sparkman* is vague, open for different interpretations and all parties in the justice system needs to know their simplified actual meanings.

2- America needs to know in order to remove any doubt. The decision was 5 to 3 with one dissenting vote when this court made its ruling in 1978.

3-Petitioner has been harmed by the lower courts interpreting. He has other cases that will come to this court unless he gets a clarification.

4- Petitioner asks this honorable body to move this issue forward with a clear interpretation.

5-Unless the court clarifies the meaning of Stump v Sparkman, immunity for judges, the issue will expand as to what a judge can do in their court. There has to be a limit of all judge's actions, at

some point in law and this court needs to make sure that all decisions are a correct decision, so everyone is playing the same game, by the same rules.

6- A clear definition gives honest judges, lawyers and average persons a better shot at equal justice.

7- Every honest ethical judge in America would welcome a clarification of the meaning of Stump v. Sparkman.

8- The trial court and the court of appeals both are defending Judge King because they know Flint sued the judges. Neither court listened to the audio CD to search for the truth. The CD proves that Flint did nothing to cause Judge King to threaten to put Flint in jail. Judge King did not give Flint Due Process. The CD is what every judge should have listened to and none did. The Federal District court and the Sixth District Court of Appeals are not interested in justice but only interest in showing they have power and will use it to crucify any person who would dare to try to find justice after suing judges. Flint begs this court to listen to the CD.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Edward H. Flint, Pro, Se.
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No. 10-5565

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD H. FLINT, **Plaintiff-Appellant**

v.

KATIE KING,JUDGE,

Defendant-Appellee

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky

FILED: MARCH 15, 2010

Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

Edward H. Flint petitions the court to rehear its order of January 12, 2011, affirming a district court order dismissing his civil rights complaint.

Seeking monetary and equitable relief, Flint sued Judge Katie King of the Jefferson (County) District Court, claiming that Judge King was derelict in her duties and that she violated his constitutional rights by threatening to place him in jail during the course of a discovery hearing. Flint also alleged that Judge King exhibited bias against him and harassed him because of a prior lawsuit he had filed against three other Jefferson County Circuit Judges. A panel of this court affirmed the dismissal of Flint's lawsuit against those judges. *Flint v. Shake*, et al., No. 09-5577 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 2009).

The District court granted Judge King's motion to dismiss, concluding that she was entitled to absolute judicial immunity because the action

underlying Flint's allegations—i.e., conducting the discovery hearing, finding Flint in contempt of court, and advising him that she would have him placed in jail if necessary to regain control of the courtroom—were all actions taken in the scope of her judicial authority and were within the court's jurisdiction.

On appeal, Flint reasserted his claims. He argued that Judge King improperly found him in contempt of court because he had not disrespected the court or shown any disobedience. Flint argued that *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), is bad law because it provides for immunity in situations were a judge should not be granted immunity. We affirmed the district court's judgment.

In support of his petition for rehearing, Flint argues that both the district court and this court have misinterpreted *Stump* and that Judge King is not entitled to immunity for violating laws and court rules.

Upon review, the petition for rehearing is denied. We did not misapprehend or overlook any point of law or fact when we issued our prior order. Fed.R. App. P. 40(a).

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

(s) Leonard Green
Leonard Green, Clerk

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

NO. 10-5565

EDWARD H. FLINT, **Plaintiff-Appellant**

v.

KATIE KING, Judge

Defendant-Appellee

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky

FILED January 12, 2011

Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge, DAUGHTREY, and GRIFFIN Circuit Judges

Edward H. Flint, proceeding pro, se, appeals from a district court judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to rule 34(j) (1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

Seeking monetary and equitable relief, Flint sued Judge Katie King of the Jefferson (County) District Court, claiming that Judge King was derelict in her duties and that she violated his constitutional rights be threatening to place him in jail during the course of a discovery hearing. Flint also alleged that Judge King exhibited bias against him and harassed him because of a prior lawsuit he had filed against three other Jefferson County Circuit Judges. A panel of this court affirmed the dismissal of Flint lawsuit against those judges, *Flint v Shake, et al.*, No 09-5577 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 2009)

The District court granted Judge King's motion to dismiss, concluding that she was entitled to absolute immunity because the actions underlying Flint's allegations—i.e, conducting the discovery hearing, finding Flint in contempt of court and advising him that she would have him placed in jail if necessary to regain control of the courtroom- - were all actions taken in the scope of her judicial authority and were within the court's jurisdiction.

On appeal, Flint reasserts his claims and argues that Judge King improperly found him in contempt of court because he had not disrespected the court or shown any disobedience. He also argues that Judge King never warned him that his conduct was "out of line". Flint argues that *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), is bad law because it provides for immunity in situations were a judge should not be granted immunity.

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed Flint complaint. We review *de novo* an order dismissing a suit for failure to stat a claim upon which relief may be granted. See *Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distrub.,Ins.*, 420 F3d 598, 605 (6th Cir.2005). In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court " must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." *Benzon*, 420 F.3d at605 (citing *Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp.*, 281 F.3d 613,619 (6th Cir. 2005). [O] a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." *Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly*, 550 550 U.S. 544,563 (2007). The complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it "contain(s) sufficient factual matter; accept as true, to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face. "*Ashcroft v.*

Iqbal, 129 U.S. CT. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 750.

Absolute judicial immunity attaches only to actions undertaken in a judicial capacity. *See Barnes v. Winchell*, 105 F. 3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. (1997). Whether an act is judicial defends on the nature and function of the act, not the act itself. *Id*. In examining the function normally reformed by a judge, courts have found that judicial act resoling disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of the court. *Id*.

The Supreme Court has explicitly state that a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he or she took was in error, was done maliciously or was done maliciously or was in excess of his or her authority. *See Stump*, 435 U.S. 356. Absolute judicial immunity is overcome only when a judge engages in non-judicial actions or when the judge's actions, though judicial in nature, are taken incomplete absence of all jurisdictions. *See Mireles v Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12. Neither of these circumstances exists here.

Here Judge King engages in conduct soundly within the scope of her judicial duties and within the court's jurisdiction. Contrary to Flint argument, even if Judge King erred in finding him in contempt of court, her decision is still protected by judicial immunity because it was made within the scope of her official duties as a judge. *See Stump*, 435 U.S. at 356-57. Finally although Flint argues that *Stump* is "bad law," it has not been overruled by the Supreme Court and we are bound by the precedent set forth therein. Hence, the district court properly concluded that Judge King was entitled to judicial immunity.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. Rule 34 (j) (2) (c), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

(s) Leonard Green

Leonard Green, Clerk

A7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY AT LOUISVILLE

CIVIL ACTION NO.3:09CV-779-S

EDWARD H. Flint — PLAINTIFF

v.

KATIE KING — DEFENDANT

ORDER

Edward H. Flint a pro se litigant in the Jefferson District Court saw his case assigned to Judge Katie King. Judge King held a hearing covering a number of discovery issues in that case at which she granted several of Flint's motions while denying the rest. The proceedings got a little heated and at some point Judge King allegedly told Flint she would have him thrown in jail, apparently in an attempt to regain control of her courtroom. Flint subsequently requested that Judge King recuse herself from the case and she did so. He nonetheless filed this pro se action alleging that Judge King's actions at the discovery hearing violated his "Constitutional civil rights" and constituted an act of "Terroristic threatening". Judge King moved to dismiss the case and we will sustain her motion on the grounds that she is absolutely immune from suit relating to any actions taken in her capacity as a judge.

Judges are generally entitled to immunity from personal liability for actions taken on the bench. "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority, rather, he will be subject to liability only when he

has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdictions." *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) quoting Bradley V. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13.) 335, 3511 (1872. A judge is also not immunity if her actions were non-judicial in nature." Brookings V. Clark, 389 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting *Mireles v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). (This rule and Flint's fear that judicial immunity would permit a judge to disfavored without consequence.) Everything Judge King did in Flint's case was within the scope of her office and jurisdiction. Evidentiary rulings abviously fit that bill, even if in error. A judge is granted the power to declare a person in contempt and hereby to put him in jail, so that she may maintain an orderly courtroom."[T]he power of punishment for contempt is regarded as an essential element of judicial authority. *Casteel v. Sparks* 226 S.W. 2d 533, 536 (Ky. 1950). Contempt may take the form of "contempt in the presence of the court, which involves disorderly behavior or insolent language which impairs due respect for the court's authority." Id. If Judge King threatened Flint with jail time for unruly behavior in the courtroom, she was not without jurisdiction to do so. Con immunity attaches and her motion to dismiss the case (DN 5) is hereby **GRANTED.** Accordingly, plaintiff's two motions to set a trial date (DNs 8, 9) are **DENIED.**

IT IS SO ORDERED

Charles R. Simpson III, Judge
United States District Court

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
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No. 10-1279

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

EDWARD H. FLINT,

Petitioner,

v.

KATIE KING, JUDGE

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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May 18, 2011

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly dismissed a civil rights complaint arising from a state judge's conduct which occurred exclusively in the courtroom during a discovery motion?

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CITATIONS OF THE OPINIONS AND ORDERS ENTERED IN THIS CASE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 24.1(d), the decisions below were unpublished. The case before the United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit was styled *Edward H. Flint v. Katie King, Judge,* Sixth Circuit No. 10-5565. The district court action before the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville was styled *Edward H. Flint v. Katie King,* Civil Action No. 3:09CV-779-S.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent Katie King was at all relevant times a duly sworn Kentucky state District Judge located in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Each and every action taken by Judge King and complained of by Petitioner Flint occurred while Judge King sat on the bench. Flint makes no allegations that Judge King acted outside of her jurisdiction or took actions outside of her official capacity.

Petitioner Flint filed his state district court action before Judge King as the result of an ongoing battle with his condominium association. Kentucky district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction which hear civil disputes that involve amounts of $4,000.00 or less. As shown by the Statement of the Case set forth in Mr. Flint's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mr. Flint filed several other lawsuits relating to his dissatisfaction with the condominium association, which he apparently confuses with the current proceeding. Mr. Flint also sued three (3) other state judges as the result of adverse rulings in his various actions. Mr. Flint, proceeding pro se, also chose to file

Petitions for Writ of Certiorari with respect to the adverse decisions of the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in connection with the other cases, as shown upon Mr. Flint's Statement of the Case.

Petitioner Flint appeared before Respondent King on only two (2) occasions. The first occasion was a Motion to Compel Discovery filed by Mr. Flint. Judge King ruled in part for the condominium association and in part for Respondent Flint. During the hearing, Petitioner Flint became extremely disruptive and Judge King was forced to threaten contempt in order to regain control of her courtroom. Judge King did not place Mr. Flint in jail or levy any sanctions or fines against Mr. Flint as a result of his conduct.

At the second and last hearing involving Mr. Flint, Judge King voluntarily recused herself at the request of Mr. Flint. Mr. Flint then opted to file a pro se civil rights suit in United States District Court for unspecified due process violations relating to the two (2) hearings.

On April 27, 2010, the United States District Court dismissed Mr. Flint's lawsuit based on judicial immunity.

Mr. Flint appealed the decision of the United States District Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixty Circuit. On January 12, 2011, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal by the District Court. On March 15, 2011, the Sixth Circuit denied Mr. Flint's Petition of Rehearing.

ARGUMENT

THE FLINT CLAIMS WERE DISMISSED BASED ON CLEARLY ESTABLISHED PRINCIPALS OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY AND DO NOT MERIT REVIEW BY THE COURT.

The actions taken by the Court below were taken in accordance with clearly established rules relating to judicial immunity. Both the circuit and district courts relied upon *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349 (1978):

> "The governing principle of law is well-established and is not questioned by the parties. As early as 1872, the court recognized that it was 'a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself'. *Bradley v. Fisher* [citation omitted]. For that reason the court held that 'judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.' 13 Wall., at 351. Later we held that this doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable in suits under Section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, for the legislative record gave no indication that Congress intended to abolish this long established principle. *Pearsan v. Ray*, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)" 435 U.S., at 355, 356."

In this instance, both actions taken by Judge King as a result of Mr. Flint's discovery motion were within the jurisdiction of the Court and taken while acting in an official capacity. In this instance, no allegations of malice or corruption were made by Mr. Flint. Accordingly, the lower courts correctly found that Judge King was immune from the suit filed by Mr. Flint.

Mr. Flint fails to present any coherent reason to grant certiorari in his petition. Mr. Flint essentially asks the court to modify or overturn principles of judicial immunity which have existed since at least 1872.

Judge King's entitlement to immunity in this instance could not be any clearer. Even if, for argument's sake only, the Court were inclined to revisit the issue of judicial immunity, the Respondent cannot envision a poorer vehicle for analyzing immunity than the facts presented by Mr. Flint. Judge King ruled only on a discovery motion filed by the Petitioner. Although Judge King found Mr. Flint in contempt as a result of his rude and abrasive conduct, Judge King did not impose any sanctions, jail time, or fines as a result of Mr. Flint's contempt. When Mr. Flint asked Judge King to recuse herself, Judge King granted the request. All of the actions taken by Judge King occurred in a public courtroom and on the record.

Mr. Flint suffered absolutely no damage as a result of the interlocutory discovery rulings by Judge King. Mr. Flint has already consumed valuable judicial resources by appealing his discovery dispute through

the Court of Appeals. No good reason exists to revive a case that borders on the frivolous.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Respondent, Katie King, respectfully requests that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Edward H. Flint be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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